主办单位：中国财政发展协同创新中心

时间：2017年10月23日（周一）12:30-14:00

地点：中财大厦3层 案例教室7（学院南路）

主讲人： Prof. Shmuel Zamir

Shmuel Zamir，耶路撒冷希伯来大学教授。他于耶路撒冷希伯来大学获得数学博士学位，师从诺贝尔经济学奖得主R. Aumann。 Zamir教授的研究领域包括不完全信息博弈和重复博弈，是世界顶尖的博弈论学者。他目前担任The International Journal of Game Theory 杂志主编，Journal of Mathematical Economics杂志副主编，Games and Economic Behavior 杂志编委，The Game Theory Society（博弈论协会）理事会成员，the Econometric Society（世界计量经济学会）院士。

In the framework of a private-value auction first-price, we consider the seller as a player in a game with the buyers in which he has private information about their realized valuations. We ask whether the seller can benefit by using his private information strategically. We find that in fact, depending upon his information, set of signals, and commitment power the seller may indeed increase his revenue by strategic transmission of his information. For example, in the case of two buyers with values distributed independently uniformly on [0，1], a seller informed of the private values of the buyers, can achieve a revenue close to 1/2 by sending verifiable messages (compared to 1/3 in the standard auction), and this is the largest revenue that he can reach with any signalling strategy.