中国精算研究院

2024年春季风险管理论坛

发布时间:2024-05-11 14:58 浏览次数:[]

报告一:间接经验、邓巴友谊环、风险判断偏差及投保规律

报告人郭振华(上海对外经贸大学)

报告摘要:根据认知心理学相关研究成果,人们主要采用“可得性启发式”基于自身经验判断出险概率,关于风险的自身经验包括直接经验和间接经验,本文针对间接经验如何影响风险判断偏差进而如何影响投保规律进行研究。结合情感距离影响风险感知的理论和邓巴的社交网络圈层理论,本文建立了个体根据间接经验进行出险概率判断的主观概率分布模型,在个体同质假设下,得到社会群体的风险判断偏差规律,并分析了风险判断偏差影响下的投保规律,主要结论是:第一,在客观概率(0, 1)区间上,随着客观概率升高,群体低估比例从近100%降低至近0%,高估比例从近0%升高至近100%,低估(高估)程度均从最高值降至近0;第二,在保险风险客观概率(0 ,0.2]区间上,随着客观概率升高,群体低估比例从近100%逐渐下降(但均在50%以上),高估比例从近0%逐渐升高,低估(高估)程度从最高值逐渐下降;第三,对客观概率(0 ,0.2]区间上的保险风险,客观概率越高,投保率越高,在消费者风险中性和保险公司只收取纯保费的条件下,客观概率为0.0001时的投保率为1.49%,客观概率为0.2时的投保率为45.92%。


报告二地震保险制度——实践、共识与思考

报告人何小伟(对外经济贸易大学)

报告摘要:作为应对地震灾害的重要手段,地震保险得到了国际社会的普遍重视。不少国家已建立起地震保险制度,旨在减轻地震灾害所带来的震荡,增强社会韧性。就我国而言,在2008年汶川地震发生之后,多地积极开展地震保险的试点。但是,从目前来看,我国地震保险制度的损失补偿功能仍然有限,各方对地震保险制度形成了一些共识,但是同时对地震保险需求、制度目标、产品设计等还存在一定分歧。


报告三Robust estimation ofajoint risk regressionmodelwith application toearthquakecatastrophe risk analysis

报告人李云仙(云南财经大学)

报告摘要:Expected shortfall (ES) or conditional tail expectation (CTE) is animportant measure infinancial and insurance risk analysis. Based on recent developments in joint quantile and ES regression, as well as its robust estimation and inference, this paper focuses on developing models to analyze the right tail of the distribution for non-negative loss variables.We propose a robust estimation algorithm to estimate the joint quantile and CTE regression model.Earthquake catastrophe risk is analyzed using the proposed model and methods. The results can be applied to the pricing ofearthquake insurance.


报告四Ambiguity andcorporatecashholdings: Evidence from China

报告人王建立(南京航空航天大学)

报告摘要:We explore the role of ambiguity, as opposed to risk, in explaining corporate financial policies. By measuring the ambiguity of the Chinese stock market based on high-frequency stock price data, we investigate its impact on firms' cash holdings. Our results show that there is a positive correlation between ambiguity and corporate cash holdings, that is, the more ambiguity, the more corporate cash holdings, but risk has an opposite effect. Moreover, the correlation becomes more pronounced as financing constraints intensify. We also conduct the mediated effects analysis and find that a part of the increased cash holdings when ambiguity rises is at the expense of forgoing current investment, and the forfeited investment constitutes the opportunity cost of the increased cash holdings by firms when ambiguity rises. To further confirm our results, we conduct a series of validation and robustness tests, including employing different measures in the cash holdings measure and in market ambiguity.


报告五Clan culture/family values and participation in online health risk sharing

报告人王向楠(中国社会科学院大学)

报告摘要:This study examines the impact of clan culture/ family values on participation in online mutual aid plans- an innovative online health risk sharing model. We use the number of genealogy books per thousand people of each surname to measure the strength of clan culture/ family values. The baseline result shows that individuals with stronger clan culture/ family values are more likely to voluntarily participate in the online mutual aid plans. We rule out four potential explanations that our clan culture/ family values measure may proxy for other factors. Our study provides insights on the interaction between culture/ sense of values and insurance plans.


报告六Morality meets risk (道德逢险)

报告人郑家昆(法国艾克斯-马赛经济学院和地中海中央理工)

报告摘要:Are people born moral (人之初,性本善?)? Recent literature shows that they may not be, but rather seek to feel moral. In particular, decision environments can influence observed morality. In a series of studies, we demonstrate that risk embedded in decision outcomes can serve as excuses for selfishness, irrespective of whether outcomes result in benefits or losses. The extent of excuse-driven behaviors varies widely and depends on various factors, such as one’s own risk preferences and the perceived risk preferences of others. A self-signaling model can account for this heterogeneity. Additionally, we show that the results observed in a non-strategic setting (i.e., dictator games) are applicable to an interpersonal strategic setting (i.e., public good games). It also appears that people hold relatively accurate beliefs about others’ excuse-driven behavior. Finally, we demonstrate that insurance plays an important role beyond being a standard risk management tool. Specifically, we need to be cautious when promoting insurance policies targeting individual risks when there is a clear trade-off between self-interest and the interests of others, as it could potentially erode morality.


主办单位:中央财经大学中国精算研究院

中国现场统计研究会风险管理与精算分会

会议时间:2024年5月25日(周六)9:00-18:00

会议地点:学院南路校区学术会堂702


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