讲座人： 马帅

讲座主题：Legal Environment and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from State Tax Codes

摘要：To constrain aggressive corporate tax reporting, states have established both criminal penalties on corporate officers and civil penalties on the corporation (i.e., shareholders). Based on the theoretical framework of Crocker and Slemrod (2005), this study examines the effect of these penalties on state corporate income tax avoidance. First, we find that the extent of criminal penalties on corporate officers reduces state tax avoidance. Second, we find that the extent of civil penalties does not reduce state tax avoidance in general, but civil penalties do have an effect as the extent of managers’ ownership increases. These findings suggest that legal penalties affect firms’ tax avoidance when those penalties have a direct impact on officers’ expected utility. Civil penalties on shareholders have an effect in reducing tax avoidance only to the extent managerial wealth is tied to shareholder wealth. Overall, our study provides theory-consistent evidence on the deterrence effect of legal penalties and has important implications for regulators and practitioners.

讲座时间：2016年12月22日，周四，15:00开始

讲座地点：学院南路学术会堂603

讲座人简介：马帅，美国American University助理教授。2009年获北京师范大学管理学学士学位，2014年获美国The University of Oklahoma会计学博士学位。主要研究兴趣包括财务会计与税务会计。研究成果发表于Journal of Accounting and Economics等国际顶尖学术期刊。

[编辑]：张萌