讲座人： Greg Clinch, Professor

讲座主题：Short Selling and Firms’ Disclosure of Bad News: Evidence from Regulation SHO

摘要：This study provides evidence that short selling influences the disclosure of bad news by firms. Managers have incentives to withhold or delay the release of bad news. As informed traders, short sellers enhance the informativeness of stock prices, especially related to bad news, potentially reducing the benefits and increasing the litigation and reputational costs of withholding bad news. We exploit a quasi-natural experimental setting provided by the introduction of SEC regulation SHO (Reg-SHO), which significantly reduced the constraints faced by short sellers for an effectively randomly selected subsample of U.S. firms (pilot firms). Relative to control firms, we find a significant increase in the likelihood of voluntary bad news management forecasts by the pilot firms, and firms provide these forecasts in a more timely manner. We also find that firms accelerate the release of quarterly bad earnings news. Each of these effects is stronger for subsamples of moderate (compared with extreme) bad news, and firms facing high (compared with low) litigation risks. Similar effects are not observed for good voluntary good news management earnings forecasts. A range of robustness tests reinforce our results.

讲座时间：2016年09月28日，周三，13:30开始

讲座地点：学院南路学术会堂702

讲座人简介： Greg Clinch教授是墨尔本大学（The University of Melbourne）会计系资深教授，是财务会计领域的国际知名学者，近期研究兴趣为：会计信息在资本市场的作用、IFRS准则等。他1988年博士毕业于斯坦福大学，先后任教于沃顿商学院、MIT、NYU等世界知名高校，在Journal of Accounting and Economics、The Accounting Review、Journal of Accounting Research、Review of Accounting Studies、Contemporary Accounting Research等期刊发表诸多论文。他曾是The Accounting Review副主编，现在是Journal of Accounting Research、Contemporary Accounting Research等期刊编委，同时任所有会计5大顶尖期刊和金融顶尖期刊Journal of Finance的审稿人。

[编辑]：张萌